Lost without a trace: the employee’s employment status by Ali Mohamed, Ashgar Ali
1 
Malaysian Court Practice 
B u l l e t i n   
LOST WITHOUT A TRACE: THE 
EMPLOYEE’S EMPLOYMENT 
STATUS
Introduction
Unless and until an annual leave request has been formally and properly approved by the company, an employee should not 
absent himself from work. Absenting oneself 
from work without prior permission or failure 
to report for duty or failure to secure approval 
for excused absence among others, is a gross 
violation of discipline. It constitutes a fundamental 
breach of contract, a serious misconduct, and 
the employee concerned may be charged for 
absenteeism and insubordination and may, if 
found guilty, be discharged from service. 
Having said the above, the issue considered in 
this article is whether the employment relationship 
of an employee may be terminated on grounds 
of frustration of contract in a situation where 
the employee mysteriously disappears without 
a trace or his whereabouts is unknown. If the 
answer to the above is in the affirmative, what is 
the reasonable period before the employer can 
resort to terminating the employment relationship? 
For example, Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 
mysteriously disappeared with many employees 
on board. As there was no proof of the sighting of 
wreckage of the airplane, it is difficult to assume 
that the airplane had crashed and those on board 
had died. In the aforesaid circumstances, the 
employment status of those employees on board 
arises and what a prudent employer should do in 
the given scenario. Again, the recent case where 
an employee never returned after an outstation 
trip, the employer would be in a dilemma of 
whether to continue his employment status or to 
terminate the employment relationship. This is due 
to the fact that the cause of his disappearance 
is unknown.
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Leave of Absence
Leave from employment is not a matter of right of 
the employee but is subject to the approval by the 
employer. Therefore, prior permission is required 
before an employee takes leave. An employee 
who absents himself from work for example, on 
medical leave, is statutorily required to inform 
his employer of such sick leave within 48 hours 
of the commencement of the said leave and his 
failure to so inform his employer shall be deemed 
to absent himself from work without reasonable 
excuse. It is wrong for the employee to assume 
that he could stay away from work without prior 
approval from and notification to the employer.1 
In Pan Global Textiles Bhd, Pulau Pinang v Ang 
Beng Teik,2 the Federal Court held, inter alia, 
that: ‘No employee can claim as a matter of right 
leave of absence without permission and when 
there might not be any permission for the same. 
Remaining absent without any permission is 
gross violation of discipline. Hence, continued 
absence from work without permission will 
constitute misconduct justifying the discharge 
of a workman from service.’ 
Section 15(2) of the Employment Act 19553 
provides that an employee is deemed to have 
broken his contract of service with the employer 
‘if he has been continuously absent from work 
for more than two consecutive working days, 
1 See Noriah bt Shahidin v Shin-Etsu Polymer (M) 
Sdn Bhd [2012] 4 ILJ 409; [2012] 3 ILR 279 
where it was stated that claimant could have 
helped herself by making a telephone call to 
the company to inform them that she could 
not attend work on 8 January 2003 owing to 
her domestic problem. It was wrong for her to 
assume that she could stay away from work 
without prior approval from and notification to 
her employer.
2 [2002] 2 MLJ 27, FC. See also the Employment 
Act 1955 s 60F(2)(b); Sykt Telekom Malaysia 
Bhd v Madurai Veeran a/l Gopal [1992] 1 ILR 
282; Malaysia Airlines System Bhd v Julais 
Stephen [2005] 3 ILR 34.
3 Employment Act 1955 (Act 265).
001 MCP Bulletin 042014.indd   1 8/14/14   3:58:47 PM
 2
Legal Editors
Shalini Sunderajan
Editorial Operations Associate
Evelynn Auyong
Publishing Director,  
Southeast Asia
Annette Rosemarie John
Printed in Malaysia by
Sincere Service Centre Sdn Bhd
67-4, Wisma Ann Koai,
Jalan Ampang
50450 KL
LexisNexis, a division of Reed 
Elsevier (Singapore) Pte Ltd RES 
(2008), is a leading provider of 
legal and professional information 
in Asia, with offices in Malaysia, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, India, 
and other regions. The complete 
range of works published by 
LexisNexis include law reports, 
legal indexes, major works, 
looseleaf services, textbooks, 
electronic products and other 
reference works for Asia.
LexisNexis Malaysia Sdn Bhd
(formerly known as Malayan Law 
Journal Sdn Bhd)
T1-L6, Level 6, Tower 1, Jaya 33
No.3, Jalan Semangat
Seksyen 13
46200 Petaling Jaya
Selangor Darul Ehsan
Tel: 03 7882 3500
Fax: 03 7882 3506
Website:www.lexisnexis.com.my
Civil Procedure is a publication 
of LexisNexis. Copyright in 
all material published in this 
newsletter  is  reta ined by 
LexisNexis. No part of this 
newsletter may be reproduced 
or transmitted in any form or by 
any means, including recording 
or photocopying without the 
wr itten permiss ion of  the 
copyright holder, application for 
which should be addressed to 
LexisNexis. Written permission 
must also be obtained before any 
part of this publication is stored in 
a retrieval system of any nature. 
The newsletter does not accept 
liability for any views, opinions, or 
advice given in the newsletter. 
Further, the contents of the 
newsletter do not necessarily 
reflect the views or opinion of 
the publisher and no liability is 
accepted in relation thereto.
without prior leave from his employer’, unless: 
(i) he has a reasonable excuse for such absence; 
and (ii) he has informed or attempted to inform 
his employer of such excuse prior to or at the 
earliest opportunity during such absence. In other 
words, continuous absence from work for more 
than two days without leave or prior permission 
from the employer or notifying the employer of 
the absence or to have obtained the approval 
of the employer before absenting himself from 
work, the worker is deemed to have committed 
a misconduct justifying his dismissal. Further, 
an employee who was found guilty of being 
absent from duty without leave, permission or 
reasonable cause shall not be entitled to be paid 
any emolument for the period during which he 
was absent from duty.4 
Needless to say that before a dismissal from 
employment on grounds of absenteeism may 
be effected, the rule of natural justice must be 
followed in the sense that the employee must 
be informed of the charge levelled against him 
and be given the right to be heard. Section 14 of 
the Employment Act 1955 (Act 265) requires the 
employer to conduct an immediate investigation 
and, if the complaint is established and upon the 
recommendation of the panel of domestic inquiry, 
the employer may take appropriate action against 
the accused employee. The Industrial Relations 
Act 1967 (Act 177) (‘IRA’) s 20(1) uses the term 
‘dismissal without just cause or excuse’ which 
implies substantive justification and procedural 
fairness. However, in light of the numerous 
decisions of the civil courts and the Industrial 
Court, a failure to hold a domestic inquiry or a 
defective domestic inquiry is not fatal but is a 
mere irregularity.5 It is the proceedings before 
the Industrial Court which is vital for the court to 
4 Ismandi bin Labot v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan 
Awam Negeri Sarawak and Others [2010] 
MLJU 637.
5 In Wong Yuen Hock v Syarikat Hong Leong 
Assurance Sdn Bhd and another appeal 
[1995] 2 MLJ 753, [1995] 3 CLJ 344, the former 
Federal Court held that the omission to conduct 
a due inquiry process will not constitute 
a dismissal without just cause or excuse. 
However, in Dreamland Corp (M) Sdn Bhd v 
Choong Chin Sooi & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 111, 
[1988] 1 CLJ, SC it was stated that pursuant 
to s 20 of the IRA it is important for the court 
to determine the reasons for the dismissal and 
the manner of the dismissal.
determine whether the misconduct complained 
of by the employer has been established and 
whether the proven misconduct constitutes just 
cause or excuse for the dismissal.6
Presumption of Death
Before addressing the issue of disapperance 
of employee and termination of employment 
relationship, it would be worthwhile noting that 
pursuant to section 18 of the Births and Deaths 
Registration Act 1957 (Act 299), that the death 
of every person dying in Malaysia and the cause 
thereof shall be registered by the Registrar for the 
registration area in which the death occurred by 
entering in a register in duplicate in the manner 
prescribed, such particulars concerning the 
death. The registration of death of a person is 
allowed only on condition that the body is found. 
As for the person whose body is not found, a court 
order is necessary declaring that the person is 
legally presumed dead. 
Section 108 of the Evidence Act 1950 (Act 56) 
(Revised 1971) and section 80 of the Syariah 
Court Evidence (Federal Territories) Act 1997 
deals with the presumption of death of a missing 
person. For example, s 108 provides, inter alia, 
that when the question is whether a man is alive 
or dead, and it is proved that he has not been 
heard of for seven years (or four years under the 
1997 Act) by those who would naturally have 
heard of him if he had been alive, the burden of 
proving that he is alive is shifted to the person 
who affirms it. As from the above, the waiting 
period before raising the action is upon the expiry 
of seven year period (or four years under the 1997 
Act). However, if there is circumstantial evidence 
that would lead a reasonable person to believe 
that the individual is deceased on the balance of 
probabilities, as in the mysterious disappearance 
of MH370, a death certificate may be issued 
without any court order.7 
Further, section 52(a) of the Islamic Family 
Law (Federal Territories) Act 1984 (Act 303) 
6 See Wong Yuen Hock v Syarikat Hong Leong 
Assurance Sdn Bhd and another appeal 
[1995] 2 MLJ 753, [1995] 3 CLJ 344, FC. See 
also in Goon Kwee Phoy v J & P Coats (M) Bhd 
[1981] 2 MLJ 129.
7 See ‘Declared death in absentia’ at http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declared_death_in_
absentia
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provides that long absence without knowing the 
whereabouts of the husband is one of the major 
circumstances under which a wife may, if she so 
desires, seek a legal release from her marriage 
bond by way of divorce or annulment, depending 
on the particular situation. The above section 
provides, inter alia, that a woman married in 
accordance with Hukum Syara’ shall be entitled 
to obtain an order for the dissolution of marriage 
or fasakh on the ground that the whereabouts of 
her husband has not been known for a period 
of more than one year. Likewise, section 54(1)
(c) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) 
Act 1976 provides that the petitioner is entitled 
to apply for divorce when the respondent has 
deserted the petitioner for a continuous period 
of at least two years immediately preceding 
the presentation of the petition. It is noteworthy 
however that an unintentional abandonment is 
not a desertion. For example, if a man is missing 
in action while serving the army, the wife may not 
obtain a divorce on grounds of desertion since 
the husband did not intend to leave the family 
and flee the marital relationship. 
Disappearance of Employee
Whether disappearance of an employee is a 
justifiable ground to terminate the employment 
relationship has to be addressed with reference 
to the doctrine of frustration of contact and 
its application to employment relationship. A 
decision has to be made to determine whether 
or not the employee’s desertion was a deliberate 
act or otherwise. Termination of employment 
on grounds of employee disappearance is not 
a decision to be taken lightly as the door to a 
possible dispute of dismissal without just cause or 
excuse may be opened. It is so because there is a 
high possibility that the affected employee might 
have been kidnapped, a serious crime under the 
Kidnapping Act 1961 (Revised 1989) Act 365, 
section 3 which carries a sentence of ‘death 
or imprisonment for life and shall, if he is not 
sentenced to death also be liable to whipping’.8 
8 The above section provides: ‘Whoever, with 
intent to hold any person for ransom, abducts 
or wrongfully confines or wrongfully restrains 
such person shall be guilty of an offence 
and shall be punished on conviction with 
death or imprisonment for life and shall, if he 
is not sentenced to death, also be liable to 
whipping.’
A
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Other circumstances would be for example where 
after a serious accident, the employee wanders 
aimlessly, unable to remember who he is or where 
he came from, lost in a dense forest, adrift at sea, 
suffering from amnesia, et cetera.
The situation however would be different if there 
is very clear evidence that the employee had 
demonstrated abandonment of employment in 
which case a long absence from the workplace 
by itself is a justifiable ground for dismissal. As 
noted earlier, absenting oneself from work without 
prior permission or failure to report for duty or 
failure to secure approval for excused absence 
among others, is a gross violation of discipline. 
It constitutes a fundamental breach of contract, 
a serious misconduct, and the employee 
concerned may be charged for absenteeism 
and insubordination and may, if found guilty, be 
discharged from service. Hence, the intention not 
to return to work is one of the essential elements 
in concluding that a desertion has taken place. 
In the aforesaid circumstances however, an 
employer should convene a disciplinary enquiry 
before taking a decision to dismiss.
However, the assumption herein is that the 
disappearance of the employee was not the 
employee’s own doing. In other words, the 
employee did not expressly or impliedly indicate 
that he did not intend to return to work. In such 
a situation, the termination of employment 
relationship would only be possible by invoking 
the doctrine of frustration of the employment 
contract. The doctrine provides the employer 
with a solution to the problem of prolong absence 
in employment. As stated earlier, an employee 
who is unable to report for work due to no fault 
of his cannot legitimately be supposed to have 
deserted/abandoned work.
Frustration of contract of employment
A contract which has been rendered physically 
impossible to fulfil by a change of circumstances 
after its formation may be discharged pursuant 
to section 57(2) of the Contracts Act 1950. The 
above section provides: ‘A contract to do an 
act which, after the contract is made, becomes 
impossible, or by reason of some event which the 
promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes 
void when the act becomes impossible or 
unlawful’. The contract is deemed frustrated 
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when there is a change in the circumstances 
which renders the contract legally or physically 
impossible of performance. The frustrating event 
must take place without blame or fault on the side 
of the party seeking to rely on it.9 
In Guan Aik Moh (KL) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Selangor 
Properties Bhd,10 Gopal Sri Ram J (as he then 
was) described the term ‘frustration of contract’ 
as: ‘a certain set of circumstances arising after 
the formation of the contract, the occurrence 
of which is due to no fault of either party and 
which renders performance of the contract by 
one or both parties physically and commercially 
impossible. The Court regards these sets of 
circumstances as releasing the parties from any 
further obligations. Where the entire performance 
of a contract becomes substantially impossible 
without any fault on either side, the contract 
is prima facie dissolved by the doctrine of 
frustration’. 
The Federal Court in the case of Goh Yew Chew 
& Anor v Soh Kian Tee,11 stated: ‘The doctrine 
of frustration is relevant when it is alleged that a 
change of circumstances after the formation of 
the contract renders it physically or commercially 
impossible to fulfil the contract. The doctrine is not 
concerned with initial impossibility which renders 
a contract void ab initio, as where a party to a 
contract undertakes to perform an act which, 
at the time the contract is made, is physically 
impossible according to existing scientific 
knowledge and achievement. Again, in Pacific 
Forest Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor v Lin Wen-Chih 
& Anor, 12 the Federal Court stated: ‘A contract 
does not become frustrated merely because it 
becomes difficult to perform. If a party has no 
money to pay his debt, it cannot be considered 
impossible to perform as it is not frustration. 
Neither can he plead frustration because the 
terms of the contract make it difficult to interpret. 
If it cannot be performed or becomes unlawful 
to perform, then the party who is to perform his 
part of the bargain can plead frustration. The 
9 See Anson’s Law of Contract, 28th Edition at 
page 530.
10 [2007] 4 MLJ 201, p 206; [2007] 3 CLJ 695, 
p 702.
11 [1970] 1 MLJ 138, p 141.
12 [2009] 6 MLJ 293; [2009] 6 CLJ 430.
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doctrine of frustration is only a special case 
to discharge a contract by an impossibility of 
performance after the contract was entered into. 
A contract is frustrated when subsequent to its 
formation a change of circumstances renders 
the contract legally or physically impossible to 
be performed.’ 
The circumstances frustrating the contract have 
to be determined objectively. The question to 
be asked is whether there has been a radical 
change in the actual effect of the promises of 
the parties construed in the light of the new 
circumstances.13
The table below illustrates the application of the 
doctrine of frustration of contract in employment 
relationship.
No Case Reasons for termination
1 Sathiaval a/l 
Maruthamuthu 
v Shell 
Malaysia 
Trading Sdn 
Bhd[1]
The plaintiff’s detention 
for two years at Pusat 
Pemulihan Akhlak, Pulau 
Jerejak was a justified 
ground to terminate the 
employment contract on 
grounds of frustration of 
contract.
2 Roslee 
bin Hadi v 
Petrochemicals 
(M) Sdn 
Bhd;[2] Pauline 
Peck v Saratim 
Insurance 
Agency 
Services Sdn 
Bhd;[3] Kempas 
Edible Oil 
Sdn Bhd v 
Abu Bakar bin 
Talib.[4]
The claimant’s illness 
or incapacity which is 
permanent or prolonged 
in nature will interfere 
materially with the 
proper performance of 
the contract. Hence, it 
was held to constitute 
a justifiable ground to 
terminate the employment 
relationship on grounds of 
frustration of contract.
[1] [1998] 1 MLJ 740.
[2]  [2012] 3 ILJ 213; [2012] 2 LNS 0434.
[3]  [2010] 3 ILR 630.
[4]  [2008] ILJU 539; [2008] 3 ILR 11.
It is submitted that an employee’s disappearance 
from employment is a ground justified to terminate 
the employment relationship on grounds of 
frustration of contract. It must be added that in 
a situation where the employee’s whereabouts 
is unknown, it would be a futile exercise for the 
employer to issue ultimatum letters to return to 
13 Ramli bin Zakaria & Ors v Government of 
Malaysia [1982] 2 MLJ 257.
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work or face dismissal, or to adhere to the rules 
of natural justice and procedural fairness as a 
precondition for a dismissal.
However, the assessment of a period of delay 
sufficient to constitute frustration is a question 
of fact and every case depends on its own 
circumstances. In Hare v Murphy Brothers 
Ltd,14 Lord Denning noted the applicable test to 
determine frustration of employment contract: 
‘In the case of a contract of employment you 
must look at the length of time he has been 
employed, the position which he held, and of 
course, most important of all, the length of time 
which he is likely to be away from his work and 
unable to perform it — and the importance of 
getting someone else to do his job meanwhile’. 
It is admitted that the employer has to make their 
management decisions and the court will only be 
concerned with whether such decision was fair 
in the circumstances of the case.
Having said the above, it is submitted that it 
would be prudent for the employer to wait for 
a reasonable period of time before ruling the 
employee’s disappearance as a ground sufficient 
to constitute frustration of contract. In determining 
the appropriate period of absence, due weight 
must be given to the employee’s length of service 
and the position held, among others. It would also 
be unreasonable to expect the employer to hold 
the position vacant for a prolonged period of time. 
Hence, as there is no case law guidance on this 
issue, it is submitted that a reasonable period 
before deciding to terminate the services of a 
14 [1974] 3 All ER 940.
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mysteriously disappeared employee is between 
three to six months from the date the affected 
employee was supposed to have returned to 
work and the said period of absence could be 
considered as being on special leave without 
pay. The above period should not be deemed 
excessive given the fact that the employer 
would need to exercise caution by making all 
the necessary inquiries before terminating the 
services. The above measures are necessary as 
the employer has to be careful to ensure that it 
does not put itself at the risk of an unfair dismissal 
claim. In the interim, the employer could obtain a 
temporary employee to replace the disappeared 
employee. It is must be added that the law 
recognised the employer’s prerogative to conduct 
its business affairs according to its own discretion 
and judgment. Therefore, it is absolutely within 
the employer’s managerial discretion to take 
back the employee in employment after his long 
mysterious disappearance.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
[1] Civil Procedure — Summary judgment 
— Whether any triable issues raised 
— Whether solicitor had breached its 
duty and undertaking as a stakeholder 
by releasing the documents prior to the 
fulfillment of all the conditions imposed 
in the undertaking 
This was the plaintiffs’ application for summary 
judgment against the third defendant pursuant 
to O 14 of the Rules of Court 2012 for damages, 
general and aggravated, as a result of the third 
defendant’s alleged breach of undertaking 
and duties as a stakeholder. The plaintiffs 
were shareholders in the second defendant 
company. By a letter dated 25 June 2009 (‘the 
first agreement’), the first defendant agreed 
to purchase the shares of the first plaintiff 
in the second defendant. It was agreed that 
as precondition before a formal Share Sale 
Agreement is completed and shares transferred, 
the first defendant should procure the settlement 
of all debts owed to the sundry creditors who 
had lent money to the second defendant. This 
agreement was supplemented by a stakeholder 
letter dated 19 February 2011 (‘the second 
agreement’) from the third defendant undertook 
to release the presigned share transfer forms 
and pre-signed letters of resignation of the 
existing directors (‘the documents’) to the first 
defendant only upon the fulfillment of the first 
defendant of three conditions, thus: (i) all debts 
to all sundry creditors had been fully settled; (ii) 
the debt to Maybank had been settled; and (iii) 
the plaintiffs’ entitlements to the main sum had 
been fully settled. The plaintiffs alleged that the 
third defendant had breach its fiduciary duties as 
a stakeholder when it released the documents to 
the first defendant prematurely in breach of their 
undertakings given. The third defendant alleged 
that they should be allowed to defend this case in 
a full trial, contending, inter alia, that the plaintiffs 
had no locus standi to initiate this action against 
them, there had been no breach of undertaking 
and/or stakeholder duties and that the plaintiffs 
had not suffered any damage.
Held: (1) The plaintiffs had satisfied the preliminary 
requirements as laid down in an application for 
summary judgment. Therefore, the burden shifted 
to the third defendant to satisfy the court why 
summary judgment should not be entered against 
them. (2) The duty of a stakeholder is to hold the 
stake in medio pending the future outcome of a 
future event; that he holds it as trustee for both 
parties to await that event, and that until that event 
is known it is his duty to keep it in his own hands. 
It was not disputed that the third defendant, as 
stakeholder, was authorised under the second 
agreement to release the documents to the first 
defendant only upon the fulfillment of the third 
conditions. The affidavit evidence showed that 
the second and third conditions had not been 
satisfied when the documents were released 
to the first defendant by the third defendant. 
At the time when the documents were released 
the debt to Maybank had not been settled. 
Although it had been deposited with the third 
defendant, it was only settled four months after 
the release of the documents. Similarly, although 
the first defendant had issued a cheque to the 
third defendant in the sum of RM605,000, the 
said sum was not released to the plaintiffs on 
the instruction of the first defendant, hence it 
could not be said that the main sum had been 
fully settled. The third defendant had therefore 
breached its duty as stakeholder by releasing 
the documents prematurely in contravention of its 
undertaking. (3) The third defendant’s challenge 
on the issue of locus standi was without merit 
as the second agreement was an undertaking 
given to the vendor and purchasers in the first 
agreement, who were the first plaintiff and the 
first defendant, whereas the second plaintiff 
was a legal representative of the estate of the 
deceased. Summary judgment was accordingly 
entered against the third defendant. Damages to 
be assessed. Order accordingly.
Datuk Haji Abdul Karim bin Abdul Ghani & 
Anor v M-Con Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors 
(unreported, 22 February 2013; Civil Suit No 
22NCC-300–03/2012), [2013] MLJU 595
[Annotation: National Company for Foreign Trade 
v Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd [1984] 2 MLJ 300, FC (refd); 
Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail [1992] 
1 MLJ 400, SC (refd); Kuldip Singh & Anor v 
Lembaga Letrik Negara & Anor [1983] 1 MLJ 256, 
OCJ (refd); Toh Theam Hock v Kemajuan Perwira 
Management Corps Sdn Bhd [1988] 1 MLJ 116, 
SC (refd); Dato’ Seri Au Ba Chi v Malayan United 
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Finance Bhd & Anor [1989] 3 MLJ 434, HC (refd); 
Samat Din & Partners v Bank Pembangunan (M) 
Bhd [1997] 3 MLJ 542, CA (refd); Annamalai a/l 
Subramaniam v V Muthusamy & Tan (sued as a 
firm) [2000] 7 MLJ 541, HC (refd); Amarjit Singh 
a/l Kartar Singh v Kung Boon Chin & Ors [2010] 
8 MLJ 149, HC (refd); Thomson v Commissioner 
of Police [1997] 2 All ER 762 (refd).
Rules of Court 2012 O 14.]
[2] Civil Procedure — Summary judgment 
— Whether any triable issue raised 
— Banking facilities — Change in 
shareholding without prior consent of 
the Bank
This was the plaintiff’s application for summary 
judgment for the sum of RM6,262,749.07 being 
banking facilities granted to the defendant. The 
plaintiff had cancelled the banking facilities on 
the ground that there was a substantial change 
in the shareholding and directorship of the 
defendant without the prior knowledge or consent 
of the plaintiff, in breach of the terms of the loan 
agreement.
Held: It was stipulated in the letter of offer that the 
defendant as the customer should not without first 
obtaining the prior written consent of the Bank 
allow any change in the existing shareholders 
or shareholdings. Failure to obtain prior consent 
from the Bank might cancel the facilities. There 
was a breach by the defendant therefore the 
plaintiff was entitled to cancel the facility. The 
Certificate of Indebtedness adduced was clear 
and lucid. There was nothing to indicate of 
suggest any manifest error. The defendant had 
failed to raise any triable issues therefore this 
application was allowed with cost.
Malayan Banking Bhd v Heveafil Sdn Bhd 
(unreported, 17 June 2013; Suit No 22NCC-
1398–09/2012), [2013] MLJU 636
[Annotation: National Company for Foreign 
Trade v Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd [1984] 2 MLJ 300, 
FC (refd); Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail 
[1992] 1 MLJ 400, SC (refd); Cempaka Finance 
Bhd v Ho Lai Ying (trading as KH Trading) & Anor 
[2006] 2 MLJ 685, FC (refd).
Rules of Court 2012 O 14.]
[3] Civil Procedure — Subpoena — Setting 
aside
This was the applicant’s application to set 
aside the writ of subpoena Ad Testificandum 
and Duces Tecum issued against her by the 
plaintiff requiring her to attend court for trial. The 
grounds relied were thus: (i) the applicant was 
under a duty of confidentiality under r 1206.1 of 
the Rules of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad 
(‘Bursa Rules’); (ii) public policy dictates that 
evidence relating to Bursa’s findings and/or 
investigations in respect of matters which have 
not been closed should not be made public as 
this may jeopardize the proper discharge of 
the Bursa’s duties; (iii) the evidence sought by 
the plaintiff was irrelevant to the pleaded case; 
(iv) the subpoena was speculative in nature as 
it did not specifically identify the documents 
requested from the applicant and/or Bursa; (v) the 
applicant’s evidence was unnecessary for a fair 
disposal of the suit or to save costs. The plaintiff’s 
claim against the defendant for the purported 
negligence in respect of alleged rogue trading on 
the part of the defendant’s employee Carl Wong 
at the material time. In defence, the defendant 
alleged that Carl Wong was the plaintiff’s and not 
the defendant’s agent. His actions were ‘outside 
his authority, actual or otherwise, and does not 
bind the defendant’. It was also contended that 
the plaintiff had failed to carry out proper and 
regular reconciliation and verification of his 
trading accounts.
Held: It is trite that where no useful result would 
be obtained by the attendance of a witness, 
the subpoena should be refused. It was difficult 
to see how the applicant was able to render 
any assistance in those issues given that the 
plaintiff was actually seeking to elicit evidence on 
manipulation of account by Carl Wong, disposal 
of his securities, how payments were effected 
and the procedures and policies adopted by 
the defendant in its back office and trading floor 
at the material time. Surely such evidence ought 
to be with the defendant and in its domain and 
not with third parties as the applicant or Bursa. 
The applicant could not give any information 
material or relevant of the nature sought by the 
plaintiff. It was difficult to see how the evidence 
related to the investigations conducted by Bursa 
on Carl Wong had anything to do with those 
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issues. Hence, this application was accordingly 
dismissed with costs.
Chong Chit Eng v RHB Investment Bank Bhd 
(formerly known as ‘RHB Sakura Merchant 
Bankers Bhd’) (unreported, 24 July 2013; Civil 
Suit No 22NCC-874–06/2012), [2013] MLJU 
841
[Annotation: ECM Libra Investment Bank Bhd v 
Foo Ai Meng & Ors [2013] 3 MLJ 35, CA (refd); 
Dea Ai Eng (P) v Dr Wong Seak Shoon & Anor 
[2007] 2 MLJ 357, HC (refd); Wong Sin Chong 
& Anor v Bhagwan Singh & Anor [1993] 3 MLJ 
679 (refd).
Capital Markets and Services Act 2007 s 360.]
[4] Civil Procedure — Pleadings — 
Amendment — Statement of claim 
— Whether delay in pleading fraud 
in connection with some tactical 
manoeuvre
This was the plaintiff’s application to amend the 
statement of claim. In this action, the plaintiff 
claimed for loss and damage as the concrete 
U drains supplied by the defendant to the 
plaintiff were not according to specification. The 
amendment related to the fact that the plaintiff 
ordered Non-Standard U-Drains, the costs of 
Standard and Non-Standard U-Drains and the 
reasons why the drains supplied did not follow 
the specifications of the plaintiff. There were also 
fresh allegations of fraud and cheating based 
substantially from facts already pleaded.
Held: (1) This application was made almost four 
years after the statement of claim was filed. The 
plaintiff admitted that the facts were well within 
their knowledge since 2003. The Court was drawn 
to the conclusion that the facts giving rise to the 
proposed allegation of fraud were known at the 
time of the original pleading and that the delay 
in pleading fraud was in connection with some 
tactical maneuver. (2) The proposed amendment 
would also change the suit from one character 
to another and inconsistent character. The 
application would be highly prejudicial to the 
defendant and was accordingly dismissed.
Vivamaster Sdn Bhd v Associated Concrete 
Products (M) Sdn Bhd (unreported, 12 July 
2013; Civil Suit No AT2–22–1456 of 2009), [2013] 
MLJU 851
[Annotation: Yamaha Motor Co Ltd v Yamaha 
Malaysia Sdn Bhd & Ors [1983] 1 MLJ 213, FC 
(refd); Dato’ Tan Heng Chew v Tan Kim Hor and 
another appeal [2009] 5 MLJ 790, CA (refd); 
Ismail bin Ibrahim & Ors v Sum Poh Development 
Sdn Bhd & Anor [1988] 3 MLJ 348, HC (refd).]
[5] Civil Procedure — Summary judgment 
— Whether any triable issues raised — 
Application for a declaration that the 
plaintiff was entitled to repudiate the 
agreement for the purchase of a motor 
vehicle on the ground that it was not 
roadworthy
This was the plaintiff’s application for summary 
judgment under O 14 of the Rules of Court 2012 
for a declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to 
repudiate the sale and purchase agreement, that 
the motor vehicle Peugeot 207 SV 1.6(A) bearing 
registration number WWR 6138 (‘the car’) was 
not roadworthy and unfit for its purpose and 
damages. The plaintiff purchased the car from 
the defendant on 25 April 2012. The plaintiff 
contended that despite inspections carried out 
by the defendant’s service centre on 2 May 2012, 
10 May 2012 and 15 May 2012, the problems to 
the car could not be resolved. On 19 May 2012 
the plaintiff met with an accident. The car was 
towed to Puspakom. The plaintiff claimed that 
the brake was not functioning based on a copy 
of report issued by Puspakom. The defendant 
maintained that the car was in good condition 
and that the problems encountered by the plaintiff 
were during the validity of the manufacturer’s 
warranty period. The defendant contended that 
as the case involved technical issued, it should 
be tried in full.
Held: (1) The plaintiff had satisfied the preliminary 
requirements in an application for summary 
judgment, viz, the defendant had entered 
appearance, the statement of claim had been 
served on the defendant, the affidavit in support 
was in compliance with O 14 r 2 of the Rules of 
Court 2012. The burden was therefore shifted to 
the defendant to satisfy the court why judgment 
should not be entered against them. (2) Whilst 
admitting that the plaintiff made numerous visits 
to the defendant’s service centre on various 
complaints, the defendant contended that it was 
not the brake failure that caused the accident and 
that the brake failure was caused by the impact 
after the collision. However, the defendant did 
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not adduce any evidence at all to support their 
contention. The onus rested on the defendant 
to prove the car was roadworthy, which the 
defendant failed in discharging such a burden. 
No evidence was put forth by the defendant to 
substantiate the alleged technical issue that 
should be heard in an open court. Accordingly 
the plaintiff’s application was allowed with 
costs.
Chua Hee Tuan v Nasim Sdn Bhd (unreported, 
1 August 2013; Civil Suit No 22NCVC-91–
01/2013), [2013] MLJU 903
[Annotation: National Company for Foreign 
Trade v Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd [1984] 2 MLJ 300, 
FC (refd); Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail 
[1992] 1 MLJ 400, SC (refd); Puncak Niaga (M) 
Sdn Bhd v NZ Wheels Sdn Bhd [2012] 1 MLJ 27, 
CA (refd); Henderson v Henry E Jenkins & Sons 
& Anor [1969] 2 QB 188 (refd).
Rules of Court 2012 O 14.]
[6] Civil Procedure — Striking out — 
Statement of claim — Limitation as a 
shield and not a sword — Whether a debt 
that is time-barred is extinguished
In this action, the plaintiff sought an order to 
compel the defendant to hand over all security 
documents, to execute all documents to discharge 
the subject property and to remove all information 
pertaining to the plaintiff’s debt to the defendant. 
This was the defendant’s application under O 18 
r 19(a) and/or (b) and/or (d) of the Rules of Court 
2012 to strike out the plaintiff’s writ and statement 
of claim dated 11 March 2013. The defendant had 
commenced legal action vide the Kuala Lumpur 
High Court Suit No D-22–855 of 2009 (‘the suit’) 
which was struck out by the High Court on the 
ground of statute barred. The defendant’s appeal 
to the Court of Appeal and leave to appeal to 
the Federal Court were dismissed. The plaintiff 
contended that since the defendant’s claim was 
struck out, his debt towards the defendant was 
also extinguished, hence the present action. The 
defendant argued that although the suit had been 
struck out, the debt would continue to subsist. 
The decision in striking out had only prevented 
the defendant from executing any legal remedies 
to recover the said debt from the plaintiff.
Held: (1) It is trite law that limitation can only be 
used as a shield and not a sword. Statutes of 
limitation which bar the remedy, but not the right, 
are rules of procedure only. Surely it would be 
a grave injustice to the defendant if the plaintiff 
were entitled to recover the subject property free 
from encumbrances whilst the loan still remained 
unsettled, merely because the defendant’s 
remedy had been barred by limitation. (2) In 
any event, the plaintiff’s prayers in the present 
suit could have been brought in and litigated 
during the hearing of the defendant’s claim in 
the suit. The present action was therefore barred 
by the doctrine of res judicata. This action was 
accordingly struck out with costs.
Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai v CIMB Bank Bhd 
(unreported, 16 May 2013; Civil Suit No 22NCVC-
249–03/2013), [2013] MLJU 910
[Annotation: Sakapp Commodities (M) Sdn 
Bhd v Cecil Abraham (executor of the estate of 
Loo Cheng Ghee) [1998] 4 MLJ 651, CA (refd); 
Othman & Anor v Mek [1972] 2 MLJ158, FC (refd); 
24 Halsbury 3rd Ed, p 181 (refd); AN Hassan 
v Bumiputra Commerce Finance Bhd [2003] 
6 CLJ 301 (refd); CIMB Bank Bhd v Muzlan Ariffin 
[2011] 8 CLJ 945 (refd); Tan Siew Chin Sdn Bhd 
v Perbadanan Pengurusan Sri Pantai [2013] 
2 MLJ 513 (refd);
Rules of Court 2012 O 18 r 19.]
[7] Civil Procedure — Judgments and 
orders — Application to set aside 
judgment in default of appearance 
— Service was by way of ordinary 
registered post instead of prepaid AR 
registered post — Certificate of non 
appearance was taken out only after 
judgment was entered — Notice of 
motion was not served on defendant 
— Whether notice of motion to enter 
judgment could be disposed off by the 
senior assistant registrar — Whether 
judgment in default of appearance 
ought to be set aside
The defendant sought to set aside a judgment in 
default of appearance in a medical negligence 
suit on grounds that the service of the writ of 
summons and statement of claim was irregular 
and invalid and not in accordance with O 10 
r 1(1) of the Rules of the High Court 1980. There 
was no certificate of non-appearance produced 
by the plaintiff when praying for judgment to be 
entered on 9 May 2012 as required under O 13 
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r 7 of the Rules of the High Court 1980. It was 
only taken out on 4 December 2012. The notice 
of motion to enter judgment was improper and 
invalid because it should have been made by 
way of summons and not by motion as per O 13 
r 6(3) of the Rules of the High Court 1980; affidavit 
in support of the notice of motion should not be 
deposed by the plaintiff’s counsel; the notice of 
motion was never served on the defendant and 
should not had been heard ex-parte.
Held: (1) The service on the defendant as the 
law stood, could only be affected by the use of 
the prepaid AR registered post and not by way 
of ordinary registered post. It was quite clear 
there was obvious non-compliance to serve the 
defendant on the mode as prescribed by O 10 
r 1 of the Rules of the High Court. (2) The said 
certificate of non-appearance was only taken out 
by the plaintiff on the 4 December 2012, whereas 
the judgment in default was obtained on the 
9 May 2012. The plaintiff did not disclose that at 
the time when he extracted the said judgment he 
was not in possession or even filed for certificate 
of non appearance. This non disclosure was 
very damaging to the plaintiff’s case. (3) The 
senior assistant registrar further did not have the 
jurisdiction nor authority to hear and dispose off 
matters such as motion to set aside or to enter 
judgment in default of appearance. Motions 
are heard by a High Court judge in open court. 
Under O 8 r 2, except where an application may 
properly be made ex parte, no motion shall be 
made without previous notice to parties affected 
thereby. (4) Further the use of the word ‘must’ in 
O 13 r 6(3) indicate that this requirement to serve 
on the defendant against whom it is sought to 
enter judgment is a mandatory provision. This 
word is present in both the 1980 and 2012 Rules 
of the High Court. It is an absolute obligation to 
comply. It was wrong for the plaintiff to inform the 
court that the motion was an ex parte application 
when clearly it was not so. Hence defendant’s 
application allowed with costs of RM10,000.
Lo Kui Chen @ Lo Kui Jin v Dr Kalayarasu a/l 
Subramaniam (practising under the name and 
style of Klinik Khoo) (unreported, 14 August 2013; 
Suit No SDK-22–60/12-2011), [2013] MLJU 968
[Annotation: Structural Concrete Sdn Bhd & Ors 
v Wing Tiek Holdings Bhd [1997] 1 MLJ 581, 
CA (refd); Duli Yang Amat Mulia Tunku Ibrahim 
Ismail Ibni Sultan Iskandar Al-Haj Tunku Mahkota 
Johor v Datuk Captain Hamzah bin Mohd Noor 
and another appeal [2009] 4 MLJ 149, FC (refd); 
Pacific Inter-link Sdn Bhd v Pemilik Kapal atau 
Vesel ‘Makatsarija’ [1999] MLJU 721; [2000] 2 
CLJ 679 (refd).
Rules of the High Court 1980 O 1A, O 2, O 8 r 2, 
O 10 r 1(1), O 12 r 4, O 13 rr 6, 6(3), 7, O 62 rr 
4(2), 10, 400.]
[8] Civil Procedure — Declaration — 
Whether correct procedure in the 
circumstances — Application to 
declare void an insurance policy on 
the ground that there were elements of 
fraud based on second respondent’s 
statutory declaration and an earlier 
police report — Second respondent 
had already retracted his statutory 
declaration and the earlier police report 
— Matters were still being heard at the 
sessions court — Whether 96(3) of the 
Road Transport Act 1987 applicable 
— Whether court ought to grant such 
declaration
On 22 May 2011 an accident allegedly occurred 
involving the motorcycle owned by the third 
respondent (‘R3’) which was ridden by the 
second respondent (‘R2’) in Penang, and 
another motorcycle which was ridden by the first 
respondent (‘R1’). R2 lodged a police report on 
the accident (‘the first police report’). As a result of 
the accident, R1 filed an action in the Butterworth 
sessions court against R2 and R3. R2 and R3 
alleged that after they had filed the defence, two 
adjusters from the applicant, threatened R2 and 
brought R2 to the magistrate’s court, Slim River, 
Perak to make a statutory declaration (‘SD’) and a 
second police report denying the involvement of 
the motorcycle of R2 and R3 in the said accident 
with R1’s motorcycle. The hearing of the session 
court case had proceeded. R2 and R3 were 
informed by the investigating officer (‘IO’) that he 
had been called twice to give evidence regarding 
the accident. On both occasions, the IO had 
confirmed the involvement of the motorcycle 
of R2 and R3 with the motorcycle of R1 in the 
accident. R2 was dissatisfied with the applicant’s 
allegations against him. He lodged a third police 
report to confirm his involvement in the accident 
and retracted his second police report. R2 denied 
that he had made a false police report to help R1 
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in his case. He maintained that the accident did 
really happen between his motorcycle and R1’s 
motorcycle, as he had stated in his first police 
report, and in his defence in the case and in the 
third police report. The applicant applied for a 
declaration to declare void the insurance policy 
for R2 and R3’s motorcycle on the ground that 
there were elements of fraud which could be a 
vitiating factor in any insurance coverage.
Held: (1) The application could not be allowed 
since there were serious disputes on fact ie 
whether there was fraud, or conspiracy between 
R1 and R2 to lodge a false police report on the 
alleged accident. (2) The fact remained that R2 
had subsequently retracted the contents of his 
SD and lodged the third police report to that 
effect. Therefore, clearly the whole basis for the 
applicant’s application had been removed and 
no longer existed. (3) Under s 96(1) of the Road 
Transport Act 1987 (‘the RTA’), the insurer is liable 
to pay for any judgment sum given against the 
insured person who is covered under the policy 
issued by the insurer. The applicant should 
not be allowed to obtain the declaration under 
s 96(3) of the RTA since the application for such 
declaration was made after, and not before the 
date the liability was incurred ie before the date 
of the alleged accident. Hence, application 
dismissed.
Pacific & Orient Insurance Co Bhd v Muhammad 
Kamil bin Abd Shakur & Ors (unreported, 14 
October 2013; Suit No 24 NCVC-1154–07/2013), 
[2013] MLJU 1042
[Annotation: Kurnia Insurans (M) Bhd v Nik Mohd 
Faizul Bin Nik Mustafa & Anor [2013] 9 MLJ 675 
(refd); Kurnia Insurans (M) Bhd v Alunan Pesona 
Sdn Bhd and Anor [2011] MLJU 554 (refd).
Road Transport Act 1987 s 96(1), 96(3); Rules of 
Court 2012 O 5 r 2.]
[9] Civil Procedure — Jurisdiction — 
Matters relating to Islamic religion — 
Subject matter of leave application 
relates to validity or otherwise of Fatwa 
— Whether civil court has jurisdiction 
to hear matter
The applicant sought leave to file an application 
for judicial review related to the Fatwa of ‘Hukum 
Ajaran Jurozan bin Abdul Latif @ Ahmad Walidie 
Yang berpusat di Madrasah At Taqwa Batu 14 
Hulu Langat Selangor’ which was prepared by 
the fatwa committee pursuant to s 47 of the 
Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of 
Selangor) Enactment 2003 (‘the enactment’) on 
the direction of HRH the Sultan of Selangor and 
which was duly gazetted pursuant to s 48(6) of 
the enactment in 2 February 2012 (‘the Fatwa’).
Held: In the light of art 121(1A) of the Federal 
Constitution (‘FC’), read in conjunction with art 
74 of the FC and Item 1 of the List of the State 
List, it was clear that the subject matter fell 
clearly within the jurisdiction of the Shariah Court. 
This court being a civil court was not seized of 
jurisdiction. Hence, the application for leave was 
dismissed.
Persatuan Anak-Anak Yatim Malaysia (melalui 
wakilnya Dr Idris bin Musa) v Jawatankuasa 
Fatwa Negeri Selangor Majlis Agama Islam Negeri 
Selangor & Anor (unreported, 23 September 
2013; Notice of Motion No 25–15–02 of 2013), 
[2013] MLJU 972
[Annotation: Abdul Shaik bin Md Ibrahim & 
Anor v Hussein bin Ibrahim & Ors [1999] 5 MLJ 
618, HC (refd); Association of Bank Officers, 
Peninsular Malaysia v Malayan Commercial 
Banks Association [1990] 3 MLJ 228, SC (refd); 
Dalip Kaur v Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis 
Daerah, Bukit Mertajam & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 1, 
SC (refd); Godfrey Philips (M) Sdn Bhd v Timbalan 
Ketua Pengarah Kesihatan (Kesihatan Awam), 
Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia [2011] 9 CLJ 
670 (refd); Lina Joy v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah 
& Anor [2004] 2 MLJ 119 (refd); Md Hakim Lee v 
Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, Kuala 
Lumpur [1998] 1 MLJ 681 (refd); R v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department, ex p Cheblak 
[1991] 1 WLR 890 (refd); R v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, ex p Rukshanda Begum 
[1990] COD 107 (refd); Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh 
v Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (Perkim) 
Kedah & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 489 (refd); Tuan Hj 
Sarip Hamid & Anor v Patco Malaysia Bhd [1995] 
2 MLJ 442 (refd).
Administration of the Religion of Islam (State 
of Selangor) Enactment 2003 ss 47, 48, 48(6); 
Federal Constitution art 74, 74(2), 121(1A), Ninth 
Schedule, Item 1, List II-State List; Rules of Court 
2012 O 53 r 3.]
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[10] Civil Procedure — Mode of 
commencement — Originating 
summons — Application to continue 
proceedings as if cause begun by writ 
of summons — Whether likelihood 
of any substantial dispute of fact in 
proceedings
The plaintiff by way of an originating summons 
sought several declaratory orders, among 
others, regarding the plaintiff’s exclusive right, 
as a registered owner of a property (‘Lot 46’) 
pursuant to s 44(1)(a) of the National Land Code 
(‘the NLC’) and the encroachment and trespass 
committed by the first defendant on part of Lot 46. 
The first defendant applied by way of a summons 
in chambers pursuant to O 28 r 8 of the Rules of 
the High Court 1980 for, among others, an order 
for the proceedings in the cause commenced 
by way of originating summons to continue 
as if the cause had been begun by writ of 
summons. The first defendant had applied to the 
Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur land office 
administrator (‘land administrator’) for creation of 
a right of way (‘ROW’) over part of the plaintiff’s 
Lot 46. It was the first defendant’s contention that 
on 2 February 2010, the land administrator had 
allowed first defendant’s application for the ROW 
(‘land administrator’s order’). On 29 June 2011, 
the first defendant received a letter from the land 
administrator informing that the final decision and 
the order creating the private ROW over part of 
Lot 46 had not been made (‘land administrator’s 
impugned action’). On 3 August 2011, the first 
defendant appealed pursuant to s 418 of the NLC 
against the land administrator’s impugned action 
which was dismissed by the High Court. However 
the High Court ordered the land administrator to 
re-open the enquiry regarding first defendant’s 
application to create a private ROW from the first 
defendant’s land at Lot 48 through a part of the 
plaintiff’s land at Lot 46 and to give an appropriate 
decision in accordance with the provisions of 
the NLC. The plaintiff contended that the land 
administrator had already ruled that there was 
no private ROW in favour of defendant through 
Lot 46. There was no endorsement of a ROW on 
Lot 46 pursuant to s 391 of the NLC.
Held: (1) It was clear that to date, there was 
no court order or land administrator’s decision 
confirming that first defendant had a legal ROW 
over part of Lot 46. There was no appeal filed by 
first defendant against the court order dated 18 
June 2013. That order was therefore final and 
binding regarding all issues of ROW in relation 
to Lot 46, unless, subsequent to this, there was 
an approval given by the land administrator to 
first defendant for his application. (2) If at all first 
defendant wished to pursue its application before 
the land administrator for the ROW, it had to do so 
in the re-opening of the enquiry to be conducted 
by the land administrator pursuant to the order of 
the High Court dated 18 June 2013. Thus, there 
was no question of first defendant having a ROW 
over Lot 46 at this point in time. In the present 
circumstances, there was no likelihood that this 
would amount to a substantial dispute of fact in 
the proceedings for this originating summons. 
(3) The matter could be commenced by way of an 
originating summons since it fell within the scope 
of O 5 r 4(1)(a) or (b) of the Rules of Court 2012. 
Hence, application dismissed.
Perbadanan Pengurusan Villa Putra v Mayland 
View Sdn Bhd & Anor (unreported, 4 September 
2013; Originating Summons No 24-NCVC-2649–
10 of 2011), [2013] MLJU 1046
[Annotation: Ng Wan Siew v Teoh Sin [1963] 
1 MLJ 103 (refd); Ong Ah Moy v Nga Ah Fan & 
Ors [1978] 1 MLJ 177 (refd); Pesurohjaya Ibu 
Kota Kuala Lumpur v Public Trustee & Ors [1971] 
2 MLJ 30 (refd).
National Land Code ss 34, 44(1)(a), 391, 418; 
Rules of the High Court 1980 O 5 rr 3, 4(1), 4(2), 
O 28 r 8; Rules of Court 2012 O 5 r 4(1)(a), (1)
(b), (2)(b).]
[11] Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Striking 
out — Franchise business — Purported 
representation made by defendant — 
Allegation of purported representation 
never made even after termination 
of franchise agreement — Whether 
plaintiff’s contention bare assertion
Perbadanan Nasional Berhad (‘PNS’) and 
Ministry of Entrepreneurs and Cooperative 
organised a Women Graduate Franchise 
Program and attended by one of the plaintiff’s 
director. The plaintiff’s director was required to 
choose a franchise business from one of the 
franchisors listed with PNS failing which a fee 
of RM15,000 will be imposed by PNS on the 
director for attending the program. The purported 
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representation made by the defendant was that 
the defendant purportedly convinced the plaintiff 
that the franchise outlet offered by the defendant 
would bring an initial return of not less than 
RM5,000 a month (‘purported representation’). 
With such purported representation the plaintiff 
subsequently entered into a franchise agreement 
with the defendant. The plaintiff contended that 
the defendant purportedly failed to fulfill its 
obligations under the said franchise agreement. 
The damages and relief claimed by the plaintiff 
were said to be losses suffered by it arising 
from the purported representation made by the 
defendant. The defendant applied to strike out 
the plaintiff’s claim under O 18 r 19(1)(b) or (d) 
of the Rules of Court 2012.
Held: (1) At all material times, prior to the 
commencement of this action, the plaintiff had 
never alleged that the defendant made the 
purported representation before the franchise 
agreement was executed in August 2006. The 
plaintiff also did not raise any allegation of the 
purported representation after the termination 
of the franchise agreement in February 2008. 
The plaintiff’s contention was an afterthought. 
(2) The plaintiff also failed to disclose the identity 
of the person who purportedly made the purported 
representation on behalf of the defendant, or the 
time, date or place the purported representation 
was made. Therefore, the plaintiff’s contention 
was obviously a bare assertion and without 
merits. (3) The purported breach alleged by the 
plaintiff was irrelevant to the relief claimed by the 
plaintiff as the relief sought was said to be the 
losses suffered by the plaintiff arising from the 
purported representation and not breach of the 
franchise agreement. There was no documentary 
evidence to support the plaintiffs allegation of 
the purported breach, even though the plaintiff 
claimed it took place since August 2006. (4) The 
fact that the plaintiff even continued to act as a 
franchisee of the defendant until termination of 
the franchise agreement by the defendant clearly 
showed the contradiction between its allegation 
and the plaintiff’s conduct. Hence the application 
was allowed.
HNR Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Harian Shoes 
Sdn Bhd (unreported, 18 October 2013; Writ 
Summon No 22-NCVC-131–02 of 2013), [2013] 
MLJU 1080
[Annotation: Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v 
United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 
3 MLJ 36; [1993] 4 CLJ 7 (refd).
Rules of Court 2012 O 18 r 19(1)(b), (d).]
[12] Civil Procedure — Security for costs 
— Place of residence of plaintiff — 
Address of plaintiff in countries not 
listed in First Schedule of Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 
— Whether plaintiff ought to provide 
security for costs
The defendant applied for security for costs 
pursuant to O 23 of the Rules of Court 2012 
amounting to RM160,000. The defendant 
contended that the first plaintiff was a private 
limited company incorporated in Riyadh, Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia whereas the second plaintiff was 
a private limited company in Dubai, United Arab 
Emirates. The addresses stated in the writ and 
statement of claim were incomplete and vague 
whereby the first plaintiff merely stated its PO 
Box number and the second plaintiff merely 
stated the industrial area in which it accepted 
correspondence.
Held: (1) The addresses as stated in paragraphs 
4 and 5 of the defendant’s affidavit were in fact 
the plaintiffs’ registered addresses and these 
addresses were located in countries which were 
not listed in the First Schedule of the Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958. It was 
therefore clear that both the plaintiffs were indeed 
ordinarily residents out of jurisdiction. (2) In the 
absence of any other argument or evidence to 
show that the plaintiffs had assets within the 
jurisdiction, it could only be concluded that the 
plaintiffs had none within the jurisdiction. Hence 
the application was allowed.
Ink Products Co Ltd v IEC Plant Engineering Sdn 
Bhd (unreported, 18 October 2013; Civil Suit 
No 22-NCVC-267–03 of 2013), [2013] MLJU 
1082
[Annotation: Faridah Begum Bte Abdullah v 
Dato’ Michael Chong [1995] 2 MLJ 404; [1995] 
2 CLJ 951 (refd); Raju Rajaram Pillai (t/a Dhanveer 
Enterprise) v MMC Power Sdn Bhd & Anor [2000] 
6 MLJ 551; [2000] 4 CLJ 189 (refd).
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 
1958 First Schedule; Rules of Court 2012 O 23, 
O 23 r 1.]
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jurisdictions.
• Analysis of revised legislation affecting various areas of civil practice.
• Precise commentary and practice-oriented approach to suit the needs of both a busy and new practitioner.
• Includes the latest legislative developments:
- New Rules of Court 2014
- New State Courts
- New State Courts Act 2014
- New Practice Directions in 2014
• Both volumes with over 4,000 pages
Key Benefits
• More than a comprehensive work on Civil Practice, it also
explains the difficult areas of the law and provides the civil
litigator with all the necessary arguments for his case.
• Covers all amendments to statutes, rules of court as well as case
law developments, practice directions, other legal sources and
practice information.
• New format cross-references to Forms which are conveniently
included at the end of each Order.
• Relied on by the Courts as persuasive authority in more than
200 reported cases and in many more unreported cases.
• Contributions by leading specialists in their fields.
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To order, please contact our Helpdesk at Tel: 1800.88.88536 or
Email: help.my@lexisnexis.com or Twitter: Twitter.com/LexisNexisMY
“Singapore Court Practice will continue to offer invaluable guidance to the practitioner and be an essential
resource for the courts.”
- Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong, in his Foreword to Singapore Court Practice 2009
“The author and the publishers are to be congratulated for producing such a valuable work which will
benefit all those involved in civil litigation. Lawyers will find the work to be an invaluable tool in their
procedural armoury.”
- Former General Editor of the Supreme Court Practice (UK) (‘the White Book’), Sir Jack I. H. Jacob, in his Foreword to
Singapore Court Practice 1999
“It is a work of considerable and enduring value. I commend [the author] most highly.”
- Chief Justice Yong Pung How, in his Foreword to Singapore Court Practice 1999
Expected Publication Date:
Volume 1 - May 2014
Volume 2 - September 2014 (Tentative)
RM
3,215.30
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